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Abstract 
With the guidance of a new institutional framework, the theoretical modelling 
establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for institutional change to occur in 
authoritarian regimes: first, external chocks must be strong, much stronger than in a democratic 
regime; second, the chocks must be of such a kind that gives rise to factional competition within 
the ruling group. It predicts that involvement by the ruled group brings about more extensive 
institutional change than that merely driven by the ruling group. The theory is then applied to 
explain rural China’s market transition. As institutional change defines pay-off structure, the 
extent of this change is approximated by the income advantage of cadre households relative to 
non-cadre households. Econometric tests based on a Chinese rural household panel data of 21 
years confirm the theoretical prediction. 
 
Keywords: Institutional change, authoritarian regime, political returns, market transition, new 
institutional economics, Chinese rural cadre.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Authoritarian regimes refer to political systems in which countries are ruled by a minor 
group of persons not chosen through voting process by the people. They correspond to all non-
democratic regimes, and cover about one third of countries and one-half of the population in 
the world. 
This study adopts an approach of new-institutional economics of which three Nobel 
price owners: Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver Eaton Williamson are the main 
contributors. Our theoretical frame is largely inspired by North’s analysis on institutional 
change in economic history. North (1992) has ever noticed the deficit of a new-institutional 
                                                          
1 65 bd. Francois Mitterrand, 63000 Clermont-ferrand, France. The author would like to thank the 
Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH; R01-HD30880, DK056350, and R01-HD38700) for the China Household National Survey 
(CHNS) data collection and analysis files since 1989.  
2 
 
 
understanding of non-democratic world: “research in the new political economy (the new 
institutional economics applied to polities) has been largely focused on the United States and 
other developed countries. While we know a lot about the characteristics of the polities of third 
world countries we have very little theory about such polities”.  
In North (1990)’s theory of institutional change, exogenous changes in the environment 
(hereafter they are called external chocks) alter relative prices, and organizations as player use 
their bargaining strength to reinforce or change the ongoing rules. Therefore, political 
competition between organizations is the key condition for institutional change to occur. 
Applying this framework to authoritarian regimes, the crucial question to answer is how could 
exist political competition? If the ruling group monopolizes the decision-making about 
institutional change and their interests are more likely linked with existing system, the status 
quo could last very long.  
Our model is grounded on following ideas. The players are divided into ruling and ruled 
groups in which only the first has decision right for institutional change. The ruling group is 
assumed to be divisible endogenously into, using conventional terms, conservative and 
reformist factions. External chocks must be much stronger than in a democratic regime, because 
the ruled group is small in size, the common interest within the group is strong, and the costs 
for reaching an agreement are low. The strength of the chocks, nonetheless, is not the unique 
requirement. They must be of such a kind that differentiates their interests, leading the 
reformists to perceive their advantages for engaging in institutional change, and making their 
bargaining strength to exceed that of the conservatives. Whenever the reformist faction is 
weaker than another one, institutional change is blocked.  
Furthermore, institutional change just coming from political competition within the 
ruling group is limited in taking into account the interests of the ruled group. Involvement in 
institutional change by the ruled group itself is a major factor. This, again, depends on the 
strength and nature of external chocks. Some types of chocks could affect relative prices to the 
advantage of the ruled group. The best example is the Black Death in Europe during 14th 
century that caused sudden wage increase. As the results of these chocks, individual choices 
and actions in consumption, production, and other activities could make on-going institutional 
setting obsolete. This involvement firstly contributes to the decision making on institutional 
change by the ruling group through reinforcing the bargaining strength of the reformists within 
the ruling group. It also gives rise to more extensive institutional change than the one merely 
driven by intra-ruling group competition. 
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Therefore, the main theoretical result established is that while the occurrence of 
institutional change in authoritarian regimes depends on the strength of external chocks, which 
is its necessary condition, the differentiation between the interests of the conservative and 
reformist factions within the ruling group and their competition, which depend on the kinds of 
external chocks, are its sufficient condition. Furthermore, the degree of popular involvement 
determines the extent of this change.  
This theory is testable, first through empirical validation with case studies, and second 
with econometrical tests. We explain China’s rural market transition using this theory through 
dividing this transition into three phases. External chocks have prompted all of them. Whereas 
the first two phases were driven by the political competition within the ruling group, the third 
proceeded with strong involvement by the ruled group through their voting by feet. 
Then we set an econometric test for verifying the prediction that with popular 
involvement, institutional change is more extensive than that merely driven by the ruling group. 
Given, following North, an institutional change defines changes in pay-off structure, and this 
structure has two dimensions: overall growth of the pay-off and its distribution among 
individuals, we are able to use global income growth and political returns reflecting income 
distribution among ruling and ruled groups as indicators to measure the extent of institutional 
change. Political returns are specific to authoritarian regimes, because in the absence of 
democracy, these returns correspond to the rents resulting from the monopoly of the ruling 
group. These returns must be changing along with institutional change that affects the power to 
control of the group. A sample of household panel data from 1989 to 2009 is constituted, and 
political returns are defined as the ratio of the net income advantage of cadre households to the 
incomes of non-cadre households. Applying fixed-effects and matching method to minimize 
estimation bias, we find that, as expected, the third phase brought about much higher income 
growth as well as sharper decrease in political returns. 
To summarize, this study has contributed to: 1) constructing a theoretical framework to 
explain the blockage and occurrence of institutional change in authoritarian regimes; 2) 
empirically illustrating the theory with Chinese rural market transition and providing 
econometric tests to the key theoretical prediction. The study, therefore, has filled the gap of 
the new institutional theory in the deficiency of theoretical setting and empirical tests on 
institutional change in authoritarian regimes.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II constructs the theoretical 
framework. Section III applies the theory to analyze Chinese rural market transition. Section 
4 
 
 
IV provides arguments for the measurement of the extent of institutional change, introduces 
data and econometric methods, and analyzes the results. Finally, section V concludes. 
II. The theory 
 
Bad institutional change happens more frequently in authoritarian regimes. In this study, 
however, institutional change, like in most previous works, implicitly refers to “good” 
institutional change that, in broad sense, leads to Pareto efficiency.  
North (1990, 1991) provides a general economic approach to institutional change. 
Institutions define the rule of the game and the pay-off structures. External chocks are the 
driving force of institutional change through altering relative prices, and creating opportunities 
for the players in the society to change the rules of the game; Organizations are players. They 
consist of groups of individuals bound together by some common objectives, and compete in 
function of the perceived advantages and costs of altering the institutional framework. 
Institutional change comes as the result of their competition. 
Applying this approach to authoritarian regimes, as a large majority of people are 
excluded from the decision making process, political competition appears absent. North (1996) 
puts major importance on political competition, and affirmed that the best political solution is 
democratization in which, political market reaches to a solution at the lowest transaction costs.  
In following model, we show that, together with some other mechanisms, political 
competition similar to democratic competition exists in authoritarian regimes in a special form. 
II.1. Political competition within the ruling group 
 
In authoritarian regimes, the competition between different factions within the ruling 
group becomes possible because the composition of the group is not homogenous (for an 
analysis on communist regime, cf. He, 1992). Adopting the most conventional way, its members 
can be distinguished into reformist and conservative factions: the former is more likely to accept 
and the latter refuse institutional change. Note 𝐽 as the decision rule for an institutional change: 
𝐽 = 𝑅 − 𝐶                                                                                                                     (1) 
 J is a function of bargaining strengths of the reformist faction R and the conservative 
faction C. Institutional change is blocked if 𝐽 ≤ 0. Otherwise the change passes. 
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Bargaining strengths of the two factions are function of the extent and kind of external 
chocks, or, the formation of two factions is endogenously determined. We firstly specify three 
effects of external chocks: 
𝑃𝑅 = 𝑃𝑅(𝐸)                                                                                                                   (2) 
where E refers to the extent and kind of external chocks, and 𝑃𝑅the relative prices effect in the 
favor of the reformist faction to the detriment of the conservative faction, with 𝜕𝑃𝑅 𝜕𝐸⁄  being 
either >0 or ≤ 0.  
While some kinds of chocks differentiate the interests of the ruling group, the others 
create changes in relative prices in the favor of the ruled group. In the context of developing 
countries in which authoritarian regimes are more likely to subsist, people potentially belonging 
to reformist faction are those with higher education level and entrepreneurial ability. One 
example of this relative prices effect is that the appearance of new technologies could valorize 
the ability of the technocrats. Some types of external chocks could favor the ruled group. In 
subsequent Chinese case, globalization stimulating a rise in wage of rural workers is an example. 
𝜕𝑃𝑅 𝜕𝐸⁄  being either >0 or ≤0 implies the difference in type of the chocks.  
A tax revenue effect is also assumed, which simply refers to a potential change in tax 
revenue between the new and old institutional settings as the consequence of external chocks: 
            𝑇 = 𝑇(𝐸)                                                                                                                     (3) 
where T is the estimated tax revenue change, with 𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝐸⁄  being either >0 or ≤ 0. 
The political stability, defined as the propensity for the change of political regime, is 
also a concern: 
             𝑆 = 𝑆(𝐸)                                                                                                                      (4) 
where S reflects the change in political stability level under the new relative to old institutional 
settings as the consequence of external chocks, with 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝐸⁄  being either >0 or ≤ 0. 
Combining these equations, and assuming that the reformists care changes in tax 
revenue, and the conservatives in political stability, we get: 
 𝐽 = 𝑅[𝑃𝑅(𝐸), 𝑇(𝐸)] − 𝐶[𝑃𝑅(𝐸), 𝑆(𝐸)]                                                                    (1.1) 
where  𝑅′>0 and 𝐶′ < 0.  
𝑅′>0 means that relative prices and tax revenue effects favor the reformist faction to 
reinforce its bargaining strength. When relative prices change provides the opportunity for some 
members of the ruling group to gain under a new institutional setting, and the gain is enough 
large to reach a Pareto efficiency (that is, the gain is always positive after recompensing the 
potential losers), the reformists benefit from a rise in bargaining strength. Likewise, tax revenue 
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effect also reinforces the bargaining power of the reformists, because they bring improved 
governmental financial conditions. 𝐶′<0 can be interpreted in a similar way: the decrease in 
political stability reinforces conservatives’ bargaining strength. 
Equation (1.1) implies that the existence of strong external chocks is a necessary 
condition for institutional change. Just like in a competitive product market in which prices are 
highly sensitive to slight adjustment between supply and demand, in a democratic regime, the 
political market insures that even a weak chock slightly altering relative prices could 
spontaneously yield a demand for institutional change. In authoritarian regimes, however, 
agreements are reached within a group of small size, thus the costs of an agreement are small. 
Furthermore, as the maintenance of their rule is a strong common interest, in the presence of 
weak chocks, the ruling group is more likely to keep unified, and blocks institutional change.  
Equation (1.1) also implies that the existence of strong external chocks is only a 
necessary condition. 𝐽 > 0 not only requires E being enough strong, but also 𝜕𝑃𝑅 𝜕𝐸⁄ > 0 , 
𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝐸⁄ > 0, and external chocks having fairly weak political stability effect (the absolute value 
of 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝐸⁄  is low). In other words, the occurrence of institutional change also depends on the 
kinds of external chocks. Some kind of chocks, albeit strong, may fail to differentiate 
sufficiently the interests of the two fractions trough 𝑃𝑅, T and S. In this case, the change could 
be blocked. Therefore, the occurrence of factional competition is the sufficient condition for 
institutional change to take place. 
II.2. Involvement by the ruled group 
 
By definition, the members of the ruled group are excluded from decision making. By 
which mechanism they are able to be involved in institutional change? Again, external chocks 
play a crucial role. 
Note A the degree of involvement by the ruled group, which is affected by the chocks 
via changes in relative prices in the favor of the ruled group (𝑃𝐴):  
𝐴 = 𝐴(𝑃𝐴(𝐸))                                                                                                             (5) 
with 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝑃𝐴 > 0⁄ , and 𝜕𝑃𝐴 𝜕𝐸⁄  either >0 or ≤ 0. 
When external chocks make actual pay-off structure defined by ongoing institutional 
setting inacceptable for most population, given political voting is unavailable, various processes 
emerge to fulfil similar function. By involvement from the ruled group, we refer to all kinds of 
actions, going from changes in individuals’ choices in consumption and production to political 
manifestations that express their discontent and weaken existing institutional setting. In rural 
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China’s case, the best example is the “voting with feet”, or leaving rural regions for cities where 
the treatment is better, which meaningfully reduced the realm of control of the ruling group. 
Another example is the prevalent absenteeism and nonchalance during work that caused huge 
inefficiency in Ex-Soviet economy. The actions of trade unions or of other organizations 
authorized in some autocratic regimes also give rise to these effects.  
Another role of popular involvement is its influence over the ruling group via changes 
in tax revenue: The demand for institutional change by ruled group, if satisfied, could increase 
tax revenue, and enhance the bargaining strength of the reformist faction. Or: 
𝑇 = 𝑇(𝐴) with 𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝐴 ≥ 0⁄                                                                                            (6) 
On the other hand, popular participation in institutional change may also cause ruling 
group’s concern about political stability: 
𝑆 = 𝑆(𝐴)        with 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝐴 ≤ 0⁄                                                                                      (7) 
To simplify, the effect of popular involvement on tax revenue and on political stability 
can be included in 𝑇(𝐸) and 𝑆(𝐸) of Equation (1.1) respectively, so that in the presence of 
popular involvement, the decision rule is always defined by Equation (1.1), but with the 
awareness that the terms  𝑇(𝐸)  and  𝑆(𝐸)  are different between with and without popular 
involvement. 
The key role of popular involvement is that institutional change, whenever decided by 
the ruling group, will become more extensive than that merely driven by the ruling group. In 
authoritarian regimes, institutional change mostly consists in giving up some control power by 
the ruling group in the favor of individual freedom of choice. This concession made as the result 
of the compromise within the ruling group must be smaller than that achieved under the pressure 
of popular involvement.  
Note V as the extent of institutional change. Without popular involvement, 
𝑉 = 𝑉(𝑅, 𝐶) with 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑅 > 0⁄ , 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝐶 < 0⁄ ; 𝑉 = 0 if 𝑅 − 𝐶 ≤ 0                             (8) 
With popular involvement,  
𝑉 = 𝑉(𝑅, 𝐶, 𝐴, ∆𝑅𝐴, ∆𝐶𝐴)                                                                                             (9) 
where 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝐴 > 0⁄ , 𝜕𝑉 𝜕∆𝑅𝐴 > 0⁄ , 𝜕𝑉 𝜕∆𝐶𝐴 < 0⁄ ; V=0 if 𝑅 + ∆𝑅𝐴 ≤ 𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝐴. 
 ∆𝑅𝐴  and ∆𝐶𝐴  are respectively induced bargaining strengths of reformist and 
conservative factions derived via Equations (6) and (7). In other words, popular involvement 
also contributes to the decision making on institutional change even though only the ruling 
group has the decision right.  
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Assuming the equal marginal effects of 𝐴, ∆𝑅𝐴, and ∆𝐶𝐴 over V in absolute value, with 
popular involvement, institutional change is bigger if: 
𝐴 + ∆𝑅𝐴 > ∆𝐶𝐴                                                                                                           (10) 
In general, this condition holds, because the ruled group is numerically important, 
leading popular participation to change significantly the balance of bargaining forces. 
Nevertheless, it is always possible that the concern for political stability leads ∆𝐶𝐴 to be so high 
that 𝑅 + ∆𝑅𝐴 ≤ 𝐶 + ∆𝐶𝐴, or institutional change is blocked. This extreme case often happens 
in political institutional change. In other cases, especially in the case of economic institution 
reforms, ∆𝐶𝐴 due to the concern to political stability should be at a reasonable level. Therefore, 
the condition defined by Equation (10) is more likely to hold, leading institutional change with 
popular involvement to be larger than that merely driven by within-ruling group competition. 
II.3. The achievability of institutional change  
As the result of foregoing analysis, the conditions under which institutional change is 
achievable or blocked can be set out.  
External chocks could be either neutral or alter relative prices. In the former case, there 
could be no influence on institutional change. In the second case, the influences depend on 1) 
if they affect relative prices that differentiate the interests of ruling elites or are in the favor of 
the ruled group;  2) if they exert tax revenue effects. Fully expressing the extent of institutional 
change as a function of external chocks, we get: 
𝑉 = 𝑉{𝑅[𝑃𝑅(𝐸), 𝑇(𝐸)], 𝐶[𝑃𝑅(𝐸), 𝑆(𝐸)], 𝐴[𝑃𝐴(𝐸)]}                                                   (11) 
Logically external chocks are also able to cause bad institutional change if all or some 
of the derivatives: 𝜕𝑃𝑅 𝜕𝐸⁄ ,  𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝐸⁄ , and 𝜕𝑃𝐴 𝜕𝐸⁄  are negative, so that 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝐸⁄ < 0. But we 
only consider the case where V≥ 0. 
On the basis of Equations (1.1) and (11), we are able to identify five typical cases 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 A typology of institutional change  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
External chock weak strong strong strong strong 
Relative bargaining strength within ruling 
group (the reformist over conservative) 
𝐽 ≤ 0 𝐽 ≤ 0 𝐽 > 0 𝐽 > 0 𝐽 ≤ 0 
Ruled group not involved not involved not involved involved involved 
Result blocked blocked small  change big  change blocked 
Source: author. 
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Case 1: When external chocks are weak, so that 
𝐽 ≤ 0  , there is not any institutional change. 
Case 2: The chocks are strong but their effects on relative prices and on tax revenue are 
quite weak (some or all of 𝜕𝑃𝑅 𝜕𝐸⁄ , 𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝐸⁄ , and 𝜕𝑃𝐴 𝜕𝐸⁄  are small), or the concern for political 
stability is too strong (the absolute value of 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝐸⁄  is high) so that 𝐽 ≤ 0 , there is not any 
institutional change. 
Case 3: Institutional change occurs with 𝜕𝑃𝑅 𝜕𝐸 > 0⁄ ,  𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝐸 > 0⁄ , small concern 
about political stability, and absent popular involvement (𝜕𝑃𝐴 𝜕𝐸⁄ = 0), so that 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝐸⁄ > 0. 
The extent of the change is small (V is small). 
Case 4: Other things being equal to Case 3, there is in addition popular involvement 
(𝜕𝑃𝐴 𝜕𝐸⁄ >0), so that not only 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝐸⁄ > 0 (institutional change occurs), but also the extent of 
change is large (V is large).  
Case 5: Other things being equal to Case 4, there is a big concern for political stability 
(𝑆(𝐸) is high in absolute value), so that 𝐽 ≤ 0, institutional change is blocked. 
III. An application to Chinese rural market transition 
Market transition is a typical case of institutional change. Chinese rural market 
transition proceeded in a context of change from collectivist command economy to market 
economy. Rural cadres, officials working in townships and villages, form the base for rural 
political and economic governance, and constitute the ruling group. Statistic information on 
rural cadres is scarce. They are estimated to be about 1.5% of rural population.2  
Three phases of Chinese rural market transition can be distinguished, and their processes 
and differences can be analyzed with the key factors derived from our theoretical framework: 
external chock, political competition within the ruling group, and the degree of popular 
involvement.  
First phase (1978-1996) was the establishment of the household-responsibility system 
(HRS). Collective land ownership kept unchanged, peasants were contracted to explore a 
certain size of land during 30 years renewable, and the yields beyond the quota was sold in free 
markets at unregulated prices. Thrusted by this change, there was a large development of the 
township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
                                                          
2 China has more than 4 million township cadres, and 5 million cadres working in 600,000 administrative 
villages (“The reform of village and township administrations”, http://baike.baidu.com/view 
/493768.htm). Assuming a half of township cadres living in urban areas, there are 7 million rural cadres.  
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The external chock driving this change was the economic crisis caused by the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), in which uninterrupted political struggles made national economy to 
reach the brink of collapse. More incentive rural production system was called for going out 
from the crisis. This was an external chock to rural region, since peasants, in the context of a 
dual society, were imposed to accept what happened in urban area.  
This was basically a cadre-driven institutional change. This chock altered relative prices 
in the favor of one part of cadres with higher education level and entrepreneurial ability. The 
naissance of TVEs started during the mid-1970s, and since then a large number of cadres were 
formed to be business managers. While the conservative faction saw loss of control in land and 
other resources, the reformist got more advantages from the expansions of TVEs, a natural 
consequence of the application of HRS, which derived important surplus labor. The reformist 
cadres also benefited from expanding trading networks owing to the growths of TVEs and of 
agricultural production.  
The involvement by peasants, the ruled group, was limited. The decision and progress 
of the change were made by cadres. Without the permission by cadres, peasants had not any 
right on how to use lands and organize productions. Peasants only passively adapted to this 
change and accepted their role assigned by cadres.  
It is noteworthy that in China, institutional change often proceeds in a form of “ex post 
institutionalization”. The reform starts at first in small scope, sometimes clandestinely. If 
producing positive results, it will be extended to other zones, and finally recognized officially. 
Otherwise, it will shrink in size and disappears. The emergence of HRS was in Xiaogang village. 
After having suffered a severe drought, 18 households secretly signed a contract with local 
cadres to be allocated lands for exploration, a method strictly forbidden under the old system. 
In 1979, similar experiments were launched and expanded in Sichuan and Anhui provinces, 
generating dramatic increases in agricultural productivity. The central government openly 
praised the reform, and new system was adopted nationwide since 1981.  
With this change, quickly cereal and food shortage disappeared, and rural 
industrialization started. Between 1982 and 1988, industrial output of TVEs grew at an average 
annual rate of 38.2% (Putterman 1997). In the end of this phase, TVEs produced over 30% of 
all China’s industrial added value, profit and output, and all TVEs across non-agricultural 
sectors created more than 15% of China’s GDP (Sun 2002). Correspondingly, employment in 
TVEs rapidly increased to reach to 125.37 million in 1998.  
The second phase (between 1997 and 2000, extendable to 2003) was marked with the 
privatization of TVES. The East Asia economic crisis in 1997 suddenly reduced market size for 
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TVEs generally adopting labor-extensive technology. Market competition had constrained the 
ability of local public enterprises to meet revenue and employment imperatives, while local 
governments’ sales-oriented growth strategies had exacerbated governance problems (Kung 
and Lin 2007). In response to this decline, many small TVEs in financial difficulties were asked 
either to close or privatized. This trend of privatization can be estimated to reach its end by 
2003 where most TVEs had been owned by private majority shareholders.  
Following the theoretical model, again, the success of privatization was due to an 
external chock: the East Asia crisis, which placed intensive pressure for the ownership change. 
More importantly, this chock made the relative prices of entrepreneurial ability appreciated. 
The Party technocrats had strong incentive for the change in ownership because it could bring 
enormous benefits to them. According to Li and Rozelle (2003), local governments almost 
always sold firms to insiders, especially to their managers or other private owners closely linked 
with local officers in large-scale TVE ownership restructuring. Therefore, this was also a cadre-
led institutional change. The big winner of the privatization was a number of cadres. Peasants 
had neither opportunities nor capital to be the owners of TVEs, and for them there was little 
difference between working in collective and private-owned TVEs.  
The process of privatization, once more, went in the way of ex post institutionalization. 
At first privatization started locally and clandestinely, then it was generalized and formally 
recognized at last. 
The third phase started from 2000, and was featured by the acceleration of rural-urban 
migration. According to the Statistic Annual Yearbooks, the share of migrant workers in total 
rural labor increased from 7.14% in 1990 to 19.47% in 2000. This share reached to 30.91% in 
2005 and to 56.17% in 2010.  
Eexternal chock came from China’s integration into globalization. Since 2000, as major 
providers of a large number of manufacturing goods, Chinese coastal regions had been enjoying 
the reputation of the “world factory”. The increase in demand and in wage incited more peasants 
to leave their villages and to work in cities. Rural-urban migration was then tightly restrained 
by a system of household registration (the Hukou system) with discriminating conditions for 
rural workers on food quota, housing, medical care, child schooling, and employment (Young 
2013). This restriction implies the absence of rural labor market. Rural workers were 
administratively kept in their villages without right of free movement. Before, with less 
attractive wage and high costs for installing in cities, staying in villages was the privileged 
choice for most farmers. With this chock, a massive increase of rural migrants can be considered 
as voting with feet against on-going institutional setting in the disfavor of peasants. 
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This phase also marked a profound evolution in the way of institutional change. It was 
no longer, as in early two phases, driven by cadres, but by peasants themselves. External shocks 
made peasants individually changed their choices in allocation of labor. These individual 
actions produced a collective effect, which made a mounting pressure on the ruling group to 
reconsider their institutional setting. To satisfy the increasing demand for labor in cities, the 
loosening of restrictions on migration came also in a way of ex post institutionalization. It 
started in few provinces in need of migrant workers. It was until 2014 that the differentiation 
between agricultural and nonagricultural Hukou statuses was definitively suppressed at the 
national level.  
Three remarks can be made from the comparison of three phases. First, they constitute 
a whole process of market formation. The first phase partially formed land and products markets. 
Since then peasants were allowed to rent their contracted lands to the others, and to sell their 
products. The second phase marked the nascent form of capital market following the 
privatization of TVEs. Finally, the third phase formed the labor market.  
Second, while two first phases were cadre-driven institutional changes, the third was 
thrusted with intense involvement by peasants. In the following empirical tests, their difference 
in impact predicted by the theory will be checked.  
Third, the success of market transition needed not only strong, but also successive 
external chocks as driving force. Furthermore, if during the first two phases, institutional change 
was driven only by cadres, whereas in the third phase peasants were involved, it is because 
external chocks exerted different relative prices effects: those favorable to reformist cadres and 
those to peasants. 
IV. Empirical tests 
The theory mainly yields two results: 1) the occurrence of strong external chocks is a 
necessary and factional competition within the ruling group a sufficient condition for 
institutional change to take place; 2) institutional change is bigger with popular involvement 
than that merely driven by the competition within the ruling group. Case studies with 
descriptive statistics are able to back the first result. This section shows why and how the second 
result is testable.  
IV.I. The measurement of institutional change 
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The test of the second result requires quantitatively measuring the extent of an 
institutional change. Following North, institution defines pay-off structure. Therefore, a more 
extensive institutional change must induce bigger change in pay-off structure. The change in 
pay-off structure has two dimensions: the growth of total pay-off and the change in its 
distribution among individuals, especially between the people belonging to the ruling and ruled 
groups. In the context of rural China, global income growth rate can reflect the first dimension, 
and changes in political returns, as will be shown, can measure the pay-off distribution. With 
these indicators, it becomes possible to verify the prediction that the third phase with popular 
involvement brought about institutional change bigger than that during the first two phases.  
Political returns can be defined as the ratio of the net gain obtained from one unit of 
investment in political activity to its opportunistic costs in other activities. These returns can be 
surrogated by the ratio of the advantage in income of the ruling group to the income of the ruled 
group. Political returns are higher in authoritarian regimes, because these returns correspond to 
the rents derived from the monopolistic position of the ruling group. The more powerful the 
monopoly, the higher political returns will be.  
A handful of work has addressed political returns. Fisman (2001) showed that in every 
case of the emergence of a string of rumors about the health of former Indonesian President 
Suharto, the returns on shares of politically dependent firms were considerably lower than the 
returns of less-dependent firms. Goldstein and Udry (2008) provided evidence that in Ghana, 
individuals holding powerful positions in local political hierarchies have more secure tenure 
rights to cultivated land and enjoy substantially higher output.  
Nee (1989) affirmed that during a transition from planning to markets in rural China, 
there may have been diminishing political returns. This is because in a central planning system, 
with economic resources concentrated in the hands of political officials, returns to political 
power and status must be high. Market transition signifies a progressive change to a competitive 
income determination, leading to decreasing political returns of them. 
Following our theory, the trend of political returns may not emerge so unidirectional. 
First, political returns could be no-decreasing because the ruling group has the possibility to 
block market transition. Second, political returns can be either no decreasing or periodically 
increasing if the pay-off structure of a cadre-driven transition is excessively to cadres’ 
advantage. Only with popular involvement, institutional change could be expected to produce 
decreasing political returns. Subsequent section will focus on how to empirically test them. 
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IV.2. Data and Estimating methods 
CHNS database is constituted with longitudinal surveys of eight waves (1989, 1991, 
1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011). 3  The surveys cover more than 30000 
individuals from about 8000 households (about two-thirds from rural and one-third from urban 
populations) in nine representative Chinese provinces. 
Cadre households are defined as the households with at least one member being village 
or township-level cadres. According to our estimation, the share of cadre households in total 
rural households is around 5% in rural China.  
608 cadre households are identified, in which at least one of household members were 
reported as a cadre in one of waves 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997 and 2000 in rural areas. As the 
Chinese government is vigilant on political topics, data on this issue is unusually incomplete. 
Some cadre households may deliberately not report the existence of cadres. To deal with this, 
the strategy adopted in this study is to consider all households that reported at least one time 
the existence of a cadre as cadre households. The year of their reporting is the starting year, and 
their cadre household status is assumed as lasting to the final wave of their participation in 
survey.  
Since some cadres, after one or several mandates, may quit their posts, could this way 
to deal with the data incompleteness lead to serious bias? Several arguments suggest 
overlooking the effect of this measurement error. First, as cadre is a stable and relatively high 
profit job, cadres in active service have an incentive to keep their posts as long as possible. 
Second, the absence of elections favors the reigning cadres to keep their posts by themselves or 
their relatives. Third, as most cadres must first be Party members, and Chinese rural areas and 
populations are large, the ratio of Party members to population is much lower than in urban 
areas.4 In most villages, a small number of households with Party members constitute a closed 
choice set for cadre nominations.5  Fourth and more importantly, becoming a cadre is an 
investment, or an establishment of a social network. The engagement in political activities 
                                                          
3 Our sample ends in 2009 because of a concern about excessive rural exodus. Extending to 2011 may 
result in disappearance of a number of observations. Meanwhile, a number of surveyed households could 
more likely report the members outside as full household members, causing estimation bias.  
4 With one fourth of 80 million Party members live in rural areas, the ratio of Party members to rural 
population is 4%, at least two times less than that in urban area. 
5  Based on qualitative interviews, Oi (1989) concluded that the importance of becoming Party 
membership resides in increasing the chances of holding office as a cadre. 
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forms an accumulative capital. Even after resignation, ex-cadres still exercise influences in 
village or township activities. Therefore, the absence of formal title could have limited effects 
on their returns. 
As we need to observe the evolution of income effects, among 608 cadre households, a 
number of them only appeared in a short period due to their interruptions in survey. Arbitrarily 
the study only keeps those that lasted at least four waves (at least 9 years). Finally, 429 cadre 
households are kept, with 2608 observations. 
To ensure comparability, first are removed the non-cadre households, of which survey 
waves started in 2004, 2006 and 2009 due to their limited lengths. Then are removed all 
households that did not participate in all surveys from their starting wave to wave 2009. This 
way, 1911 non-cadre households are kept for comparing with 429 cadre households. Thus, the 
panel data set is a total of 2340 households and 16062 observations, starting from waves 1989 
to 2000 and ending to wave 2009.  
As the first task, we define political returns as 𝜋𝑡 =
𝑌𝑐
𝑡−𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡
𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  in wave t (t=1, 2, …, N), 
where 𝑌𝑐
𝑡 and 𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  are respectively incomes of household with and without political cadre.  
Previously a number of work have explored the existence of the returns to being cadres 
and variables explaining these returns in rural China (e.g., Parish et al. 1995; Nee 1996; Parish 
and Michelson 1996; Cook 1998; Morduch and Sicular 2000; and Walder 2002). These studies 
were queried due to selection bias they encountered: If rural cadres are richer not because they 
are cadres, but because of some unobservable superior capabilities, and their becoming cadre 
and their higher income are both explained by these capabilities, the conclusion that they are 
rich because of their cadre status would not be fully convincing. In this case, econometrically, 
both explanatory and dependent variables correlate with error terms, and endogeneity leads to 
biased estimates. 
Before the presentation on how to deal with the selection bias, we list all variables 
contained in econometric tests. 
 
Table 2 Variable definitions 
  Definition 
Dependent 
variable 
Income Household per-capita annual income at constant prices. 
Explanatory 
variable 
 
 
 
State_job The share of household members working in state-owned units (enterprises, 
services and administrations). 
Collective_job   The share of household members working in TVEs. 
Private_job The share of household members working in non-farming activities 
(excluding state and collective jobs). 
Leaving_home The share of household members that left home and working in cities.  
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Control 
variable 
 
 
 
Age The average age of working adults of the household. 
Age2 Squared Age. 
Gender The share of male in total working adult number of the household. 
Education The average years in school of working adults of the household. 
Notes: 1) Data come from the CHNS database. 2) All explanatory variables are scaled by the number of 
household working adults, defined as household members over 16 years old. 
 
State_job, collective_job and private_job are three most important income sources of 
Chinese rural households. Leaving_home is used to identify the effect of household’s financial 
resources coming from members working in cities. It affects income in two ways: labors 
working outside through remittance could raise income. They may also reduce income if they 
devote income for residing in cities (e.g., housing purchasing). Age, Age2, Gender and 
Education, used here as control variables, are variables reflecting the household human capital.  
Estimations are made with following equation:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼1𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘 + ∑ 𝛼2𝑙𝑍𝑖𝑙
4
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
8
𝑡=2 (𝐶
4
𝑘=1 ∗ 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑊𝑎𝑣𝑒 + 𝜎𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (12)         
 
The dependent variable, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , is Income for household i in year t .  𝑋𝑘 is one of the 
explanatory variables.  𝑍𝑙 is one of the control variables. All these variables are defined in Table 
2. Wave is a time dummy between 1989 and 2009, in a total of 8 time points. Variable C is 
cadre household dummy. As C is time-invariant and in fixed-effects models time-invariant 
variables cannot be estimated, the cross products of cadre household dummy and Wave are used 
to capture cadre households’ income advantages over time.6 Therefore the coefficient of interest 
is 𝛽𝑡 . Unobservable household characteristics such as ability, family background and other 
intangibles are captured in 𝜇𝑖. Since in fixed-effects models, time-invariant variables cannot be 
estimated, province cross wave is used to control for province fixed effects (𝜎𝑗𝑡). Lastly, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is 
the error term. 
To address the selection bias, this study explores two econometric methods. First, the 
fixed-effects models are employed. Household-level fixed effect models have an advantage to 
partially overcome endogeneity and selection bias by using fixed effects terms 𝜇𝑖  and the 
province fixed effects 𝜎𝑗𝑡 . Also in household panel data, the serial correlation between the 
within-household error terms is a concern and this autocorrelation over time biases the t, F and 
                                                          
6 This method of using a dummy variable to interact with year dummy variables to capture the evolution 
of its impact over time has been generally employed in econometric studies (Cf. Wooldridge 2016 
chapter 14).  
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R2 values. To correct this, White Standard errors clustered at the household level are used 
throughout. 
Second, among 1911 non-cadre households, a matching method is applied to identify a 
group of non-cadre households that were as similar as possible to the cadre household group at 
the starting time of evaluation. The procedure is to match the treated and untreated individuals 
according to their observable characteristics with propensity-score matching methods (See 
Cameron and Trivedi 2005, chapter 25).  
For this purpose, per-capita income, asset, education, mean age of adults, and household 
size are used to identify the matching group. 7  They are the non-cadre households whose 
propensity scores fell within the range of scores of the cadre household observations. Finally 
as matching the households in the regions with similar development level makes sense, 
matching was separately applied in three regions: Coastal, Central and Western regions.8 This 
way a data set of 429 non-cadre households with 2801 observations is constituted. Coordinately, 
there are 1482 non-matched non-cadre households with 10653 observations.  
Table 3 presents the evolution of mean values of all variables over time by cadre 
household group, matched non-cadre household group, and non-matched non-cadre household 
group.  
 
Table 3 Mean values of variables by cadre and non-cadre households 
  1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Income Cadre 2805 3027 3473 4670 5902 7529 8645 12337 
Matched 2824 2785 3006 3989 4668 5894 6868 10608 
Non-matched non-cadre 2243 2269 2581 3395 4092 5286 5813 9042 
Age Cadre 38.13 37.50 38.24 39.71 41.70 44.55 42.21 44.44 
Matched 37.25 37.51 38.92 39.91 40.60 42.17 40.75 43.01 
Non-matched non-cadre 36.90 37.18 37.90 39.12 40.53 42.55 41.52 42.21 
Gender Cadre 0.4927 0.4935 0.4922 0.4839 0.4938 0.5025 0.4796 0.4627 
Matched 0.4856 0.4875 0.4807 0.4827 0.4862 0.4949 0.4721 0.4658 
Non-matched non-cadre  0.4915 0.4881 0.4875 0.4887 0.4948 0.4961 0.4758 0.4692 
Education Cadre 7.40 7.70 8.02 8.24 8.66 8.69 9.00 8.93 
Matched 7.36 7.36 7.49 7.86 8.35 8.41 8.68 8.58 
                                                          
7 Asset index is built following Sahn and Stifel (2000), and Filmer and Kinnon (2011), with 10 items 
(each of them offers a range of choices): drinking water, toilet facilities, kind of lighting, kind of fuel 
for cooking, type of ownership of house, surface and room number of household, ownership of electrical 
appliances and other goods, means of transportation, type of farm machinery, and finally, household 
commercial equipment. Principal components analysis is employed to derive weights. 
8 The distinction of three regions follows the standard classification in China Statistic Yearbooks. The 
distribution of observations in three regions is 32%, 39% and 29%, and that for cadre households is 34%, 
45% and 21%. 
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Non-matched non-cadre  5.93 6.21 6.41 6.75 7.21 7.38 7.62 7.60 
State_job Cadre 0.2810 0.1894 0.2011 0.1583 0.1592 0.0814 0.0736 0.0628 
Matched 0.1423 0.1270 0.1186 0.1042 0.0889 0.0363 0.0436 0.0534 
Non-matched non-cadre  0.1088 0.0714 0.0837 0.0671 0.0563 0.0233 0.0217 0.0236 
Collective_ job Cadre 0.3079 0.2604 0.2809 0.2417 0.2104 0.0123 0.0075 0.0000 
Matched 0.3123 0.3153 0.3093 0.2832 0.2635 0.0091 0.0077 0.0000 
Non-matched non-cadre  0.3082 0.2664 0.2562 0.2055 0.1973 0.0044 0.0032 0.0000 
Private_ job Cadre 0.0070 0.0051 0.0202 0.0523 0.0481 0.2172 0.1736 0.1602 
Matched 0.0079 0.0013 0.0128 0.0385 0.0654 0.2648 0.2235 0.1971 
Non-matched non-cadre  0.0096 0.0058 0.0129 0.0419 0.0560 0.2344 0.2063 0.1663 
Leaving_home Cadre 0.0142 0.0791 0.1029 0.0877 0.0958 0.2204 0.3517 0.3604 
Matched 0.0287 0.0448 0.0830 0.0771 0.0739 0.19587 0.3174 0.3134 
Non-matched non-cadre  0.0209 0.0498 0.1038 0.0713 0.0773 0.1969 0.3109 0.3257 
 
Notes: 1) Data come from the CHNS database. 2) The method of choice of cadre and non-cadre households is 
introduced in this section. 3) The constitution of matched non-cadre household group is made with propensity-
score matching method introduced in this section. 
 
These descriptive statistics provide some interesting information. First, as expected, the 
cadre group had the highest, and the non-matched non-cadre group had the lowest incomes. The 
gaps in income between cadre and matched non-cadre households were smaller. Wave 2009 
appeared to be a “bound” in terms of income growth. Through checking, it was found that 
between 2006 and 2009, there were a significant number of households that began to generate 
profits from businesses, and this meaningfully influenced the mean income of the population.  
Second, while differences in age and gender were not significant, cadre group had net 
superiority in education over non-matched non-cadre group. This gap between cadre and 
matched non-cadre groups was small. 
Third, in most waves, while cadre households’ share of employment in state-owned 
units was higher, the differences in collective-owned units between cadre and non-cadre 
households varied in periods. The share of the cadre households in private non-farm businesses, 
however, became lower than that of non-cadre households since 2000. Over the period, jobs in 
state-owned and collective-owned units decreased progressively in to the benefit of private 
businesses. This corresponds well to above analysis on market transition process. 
Finally, leaving home and working in cities were increasing so that in 2009, in all three 
groups, about one third of the working force left home.  
VI.3. Results 
 
Table 4 contains two regressing results basis on Equation (12). The values of R2 are all 
fairly satisfactory. F statistics are significant. The rho values are over 0.3. As the group variable 
is the household, high rho value signifies that the individual effects of households are strong, 
indicating the appropriateness of the fixed-effects models. 
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Table 4 Fixed-effects regression results 
 (1) Cadre vs. 
matched 
(2) Cadre vs. all 
non-cadre 
Variables Income Income 
   
State_job  2477.623 1968.870 
 (643.638)*** (362.837)*** 
Collective_job 2017.668 982.340 
 (612.735)*** (284.586)*** 
Private_job  4821.895 3626.210 
 (1021.773)*** (451.085)*** 
Leaving_home  -40.547 -249.786 
 (518.588) (260.925) 
Age  11.705 79.986 
 (84.454) (35.914)** 
Age2 0.085 -0.943 
 (0.853) (0.362)*** 
Education  287.501 191.250 
 (117.549)** (61.097)*** 
Gender  1667.032 1886.149 
 (966.438)* (452.159)*** 
Cadre_1991 272.303 176.020 
 (433.914) (280.428) 
Cadre_1993 204.495 177.419 
 (451.686) (302.866) 
Cadre_1997 711.666 800.800 
 (478.947) (328.110)** 
Cadre_2000 1367.238 1178.260 
 (527.565)*** (364.312)*** 
Cadre_2004 1762.362 1918.262 
 (583.378)*** (436.855)*** 
Cadre_2006 1907.372 2448.593 
 (780.450)** (510.057)*** 
Cadre_2009 1579.319 2776.965 
 (962.046)* (683.926)*** 
Wave_dummy yes yes 
Province × wave yes yes 
Constant -1802.668 -2098.986 
 (2396.885) (985.105)** 
   
Observations 5409 16062 
Household number 858 2340 
R-squared   
Within 0.2374 0.2180 
Between 0.2423 0.2452 
Overall 0.2435 0.2306 
F (prob>F) 11.68 27.58 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rho 0.3250 0.3120 
 
Notes: 1) Data come from the CHNS database. 2) The method of choice of cadre and non-cadre households is 
introduced in section IV.2. 3) The constitution of matched non-cadre household group with propensity-score 
matching method is introduced in section IV.2. 4) The regressions are made on the basis of Equation (12). 5) 
Robust standard error in parenthesis. 6) * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
The sample of the first regression contains cadre group and matched non-cadre group. 
That of the second regression contains cadre group and all non-cadre groups. Based on the 
previous arguments, the first estimation is deemed having less estimation bias than the second 
one. We focus on the coefficients of cadre dummy over time from cadre_1991 to cadre_2009, 
with cadre_1989 as the base line. The coefficients of cadre dummy generally confirm the 
existence of income advantage of the cadre group over time.  
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In table 5, political returns measured as 
𝑌𝑐
𝑡−𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡
𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  are computed. Recall that 𝑌𝑐
𝑡 and 𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  are 
respectively incomes of household with and without political cadre in wave t. In line “mean”, 
these returns are computed with the mean values of incomes of different groups contained in 
Table 3. In line “estimated”, the term 𝑌𝑐
𝑡 − 𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  is replaced by the estimated coefficients from 
cadre_1991 to cadre_2009 derived from Table 4.  
 
Table 5 The evolution of political returns  
   1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Income 
 
Mean 
 
Versus matched 
 
-0.007 0.087 0.155 0.171 0.264 0.277 0.259 0.163 
Versus all Non-
cadre 
0.251 0.334 0.346 0.376 0.442 0.424 0.487 0.364 
Estimated 
 
Versus matched  0.0978 0.0680 0.1784 
 
0.2929
(***) 
0.2990 
(***) 
0.2777 
(**) 
0.1489  
(*) 
Versus all Non-
cadre 
 0.0776 0.0687 0.2359 
 (**) 
0.2879 
(***) 
0.3629 
(***) 
0.4212 
(***) 
0.3071 
(***) 
 
Notes: 1) Data come from the CHNS database. 2) The method of choice of cadre and non-cadre households is 
introduced in section IV.2. 3) The constitution of matched non-cadre household group is introduced in section 
IV.2. 4) Political returns are determined as  
𝑌𝑐
𝑡−𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡
𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  where 𝑌𝑐
𝑡 and 𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  are respectively the incomes of households 
with and without political cadre in wave t. 5) The “mean” values of political returns are calculated on the basis of 
mean incomes of different groups in Table 3. 6) The “estimated” values of political returns are computed using 
the coefficients of cross-product terms in Table 4 to substitute  𝑌𝑐
𝑡 − 𝑌𝑛𝑐
𝑡  in the formula determining political 
returns. 7) For the “estimated” results, * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 in parenthesis. 
 
The values contained in line “mean” are used merely for comparisons with their 
corresponding estimated values. It is interesting to note that without using matched method, the 
estimated values are lower than mean values, whereas with matched method, the estimated 
values are higher than mean values. This seems to indicate that without matching there is an 
underestimation of political returns. Therefore, applying prudence principle, we focus on the 
results based on matching method. In the case where some estimated coefficients are 
insignificant,9  we also consider the coefficients obtained without matching and the mean values. 
The periods corresponding to three phrases are 1989-1997, 1997-2004, and 2004-2009. 
Income growth in the third period was much higher than that of the first two periods. Based on 
Table 3, income growth rates of non-matched non-cadre households of three periods were 5.3%, 
6.5% and 11.3% respectively. Those of the matched non-cadre households were 4.4%, 5.7%, 
and 12.5% respectively. During the first and second periods, as expected, political returns were 
either stagnated or increasing. During the third period, political returns saw a sharp fall, from 
                                                          
9 The coefficients of interest of three first waves are insignificant. Based on some observed incoherence, 
seemingly the quality of data collection during the early period of surveys was a concern. 
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27.77 to 14.89%. This suggests that in the third phase with popular involvement, peasants got 
larger improvements relative to cadre group, indicating that institutional change was bigger. 
Together with the difference in income growth rates, these results confirm the theoretical 
prediction that the phase with popular involvement brings about much extensive institutional 
change. 
We can also interpret this result in another way with the arguments based on Lewis 
(1954). Chinese rural region was a dual economy with unlimited labor supply. As labor price 
kept close to zero marginal products, labor market could not be formed. Low labor price caused 
low demands in product, land and capital. Consequently, all other markets, from land, capital 
to products, were constrained by the formation of labor market. The main solution was rural-
urban migration. Therefore, among three phases, the third with the formation of labor market 
brought about greater institutional improvement. Popular involvement was necessary to 
accomplish this most difficult and decisive task. 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
Motivated by North’s remarks on the deficiency of theoretical approaches to 
institutional change in less developed countries, this study constructed a theory in which 
institutional change in authoritarian regimes is explained with the interplay of external chocks, 
political competition within the ruling group, and the involvement by the ruled group. It showed 
that despite the absence of democracy, in the case of strong chocks resulting substantial changes 
in relative prices, the competition within the ruling group is working, and there is supply to 
institutional change.  
The main theoretical result established is that the occurrence of institutional change in 
a non-democratic regime depends on the strength of external chocks. This is its necessary 
condition. The differentiation between the interests of the conservative and reformist factions 
within the ruling group and their competition, which depend on the kinds of external chocks, 
are its sufficient condition. Furthermore, the theory predicts that with popular involvement, 
institutional change is more extensive than that merely driven by the ruling group.  
This theory is then applied to non-democratic post-communist regimes of which the 
most eminent example is China. The theoretical framework allows illustrating three phases of 
Chinese rural market transitions of which the last phase was featured by popular participation. 
The above theoretical prediction was validated by econometric tests. 
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